Abstract Field tests were conducted on two new information aggregation mechanism designs. The mechanisms were designed to collect information held as intuitions about opening weekend box office revenues for movies in Australia. The principles on which the mechanisms operate and their capacity to collect information are explored. A pari-mutuel mechanism produces a predicted probability distribution over box office amounts that is, with the exception of very small films, indistinguishable from the actual revenues. The second mechanism is based on guessing the guesses of others and when applied under conditions where incentives for accuracy are unavailable still performs well against data.
that are widely used in models of rational expectations, asymmetric information in games, and markets, but neither the principles themselves nor how they interact with the operational features of institutions are fully understood. The methods and approach taken in this paper differ from traditional mechanism design methods in that the structure of the mechanisms evolved from laboratory experimental methods as opposed to having been deduced from theory. Further, we depart from the familiar setting of the controlled laboratory experiment to test the mechanism in a field environment. Thus, our contributions focus on evaluating the success of these mechanisms, validating the methodology of development and the usage of experimental methods for testing and refining the mechanisms.
The paper reports a successful field test of two information aggregation mechanisms (IAMs) that depart from traditional theory and institutions. The practical challenge we confront in this field test is to collect information about opening weekend box office revenues for movies in Australia. The focus is on the performance of the IAMs when operating in a field environment that departs from the controlled, laboratory experimental settings in which mechanisms are traditionally tested with known and fixed parameters. The fundamental questions are related to measures of success and whether the messages delivered by laboratory experimental methods are robust to parameters as they are found to naturally occur in the world and if not, identify causes for the lack of robustness. This concern is among the classical questions regarding the relevance of laboratory methods for addressing problems found occurring naturally.
The movie box office test poses some challenges beyond those previously studied in tests of IAMs. The field test requires a model of how information is distributed among people as well as how that information is reflected in decisions. The tests rest on hypotheses regarding both the underlying information available to IAM participants as well as how the collected information will be presented in IAM outcomes. The predictions derived from joint hypotheses about these environmental and institutional features are then tested against the actual distribution of observed box office revenues among the films. The results demonstrate that the mechanism performs substantially as predicted by the theory consistent with the testbeds in highly controlled laboratory environments. The information about box office revenues exists to be collected. The IAMs collect it.
Information aggregation mechanisms (IAMs) are designed to collect and aggregate information held in the form of subjective beliefs and intuition dispersed among the participants. Their purpose is to quantize, collect, and organize information about the likelihood of specific events. This paper reports the results of a field application of IAMs as opposed to controlled experiments that test the ability of a mechanism to perform the task under laboratory conditions in which the information to be aggregated is known to the experimenter. Field tests explore the robustness of the IAM's ability to collect and aggregate information in environments that do not control all features of the mechanism itself, the participants' skills, the event studied, the information available about it or how it is distributed. In the field tests, neither the existence of the information nor its quality are known. The questions we must address are both (a) whether or not information exists to be aggregated and (b) whether or not the IAM is successful in gathering it.
Traditional IAM architectures are based on markets with Arrow-Debreu assets that can be traded in applications potentially lasting days or even weeks. Neither of the two architectures studied here follows that tradition. No trading takes place as participants' actions are irreversible; indeed, markets are not even part of the mechanisms. The exercise occurs once and lasts about an hour or less. The architecture of the primary IAM is similar to pari-mutuel betting processes but is explicitly designed to avoid the information distortions known to contaminate information aggregation associated with betting processes typically used for entertainment purposes. The second mechanism is completely different and is similar to the classical "guessing game" and explores the capacity to analyze events, such as those far in the future, or poorly defined events that cannot be used as a basis for structuring rewards for accurate information.
Not only are the architectures of the IAMs used here different from those typically used, the conditions of the applications are relaxed considerably. Traditional information aggregation mechanisms are deployed in environments in which the information flow is quantitatively based and available to IAM participants who understand the information, expect to detect it in the behavior of markets, and can act on it in the context of the IAM. Often IAM participants are associated with a business interest and have access to private, quantitative information related to the event of interest. By contrast, the participants in the application reported here were students associated with a film school as well as some industry professionals. We provided minimal details about the opening weekend box office for the movies directly to participants, including the number of screens the movie was opening on, key actors, release dates, etc. The information we sought to elicit existed primarily in the form of subjective impressions and opinions based on the properties of the films and possibly the success of films that share similarities.
The nature of the mechanisms
Two mechanisms are studied. One is a pari-mutuel-based IAM and the second is similar to the "guessing game" (Nagel 1995) .
In the pari-mutuel-based IAM, called Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP), the range of values that possible box office ticket sale quantities can take is partitioned into a set of non-overlapping intervals, or "buckets." The participants in an exercise are given an opportunity to purchase "tickets" and a cash prize is awarded to the holders of tickets when the variable of interest takes a value within a given bucket. Participants are allowed to buy as many tickets as they wish (up to a budget limit described below) and place them freely in any of the buckets. In this way, the distribution of tickets placed across the different buckets yields a potential measure of participants' beliefs regarding the future realization of the variable of interest. The information aggregation mechanism automatically aggregates these beliefs across participants, allowing the construction of "consensus" forecasts while also obtaining a glimpse into the underlying uncertainty.
The second mechanism directs participants to make a guess about the box office of an upcoming film. Each participant submits a single number anonymously as a guess. The actual box office will not be known within a time frame required to base payoffs on the box office when it becomes known. Indeed exactly how the box office will be measured may not be known at the time of the IAM exercise since measurement methodologies evolve. Instead, a prize is awarded to the individual(s) whose guess is closest to the median guess of all other individuals. The mechanism will be called the Guess of the Guesses (GOG).
Clearly this mechanism is exploratory in that no generally accepted theory suggests success. Typical game theory applications focused on asymmetric information rest on assumptions about an individual's understanding of the rationality of others. An alternative perspective follows from the intuition that when uninformed about the opinion of others, individuals tend to use themselves as a model. Thus, when guessing what others will guess subjects are drawing on their own guess about the box office and rewarded if they are correct.
Orientation and outline
Section 2 will focus on details of the two mechanisms, their structure, and how participants interact with the mechanisms. Basically, the section answers questions related to what participants see and what they do. Section 3 contains background material. Section 4 outlines the procedures, subjects and timing of the study. Section 5 is a discussion of the movies for which the box office is to be predicted. Section 6 introduces a model of the information environment. The section develops a general model of the information, how it is expressed and what it means to aggregate it. In this model the predicted event is not a "state" but a probability distribution and the results of the IAM are interpreted as the probability of various box office amounts. Section 7 contains results. The performance of the two IAMs are evaluated and compared. Section 8 is a summary of conclusions.
Two information aggregation mechanisms: institutional frameworks
The purpose of an information aggregation mechanism (IAM) is to quantize, collect and aggregate information held in the form of subjective intuitions by different individuals about uncertain future events. Presumably, these events are accompanied by different forms of information distributed across a population that can be represented as differentially and independently distributed signals.
The two mechanisms studied, "Boxoffice Prophecy" and "Guess of the Guesses," differ in structure and background theory. Information aggregation models (IAMs) such as Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP), rest on a hypothesis that the collection and aggregation of such information produces a combined signal that has more information content than any single signal. The mechanism produces a probability distribution that becomes interpreted as the aggregation of the existing information. The Guess of the Guesses (GOG) model is not so much an attempt to aggregate information as it is an attempt to extract an individual's information under conditions that prohibit the use of incentives based on accuracy of reports or guesses. The output can be interpreted as the distribution of modes of opinions. The orange distribution is the implied probability of all ticket purchases and the green is your choices. Notice that these are represented like a (horizontal) bar graph.
Mechanism organizers invite parƟcipants, who securely log in to their own account
The parƟcipant places the curser on a bucket and clicks. The spaces turn yellow as is the case of the $90,000-$119,999 bucket in the figure. By clicking on the PURCHASE buƩon the individual purchases a Ɵcket in that bucket. The price shown in the figure is 40 while the budget for this parƟcipant is currently 20 so the system would refuse the purchase due to insufficient cash. Had the purchase been made the number of Ɵckets held by the individual would go up by one as would the number of Ɵckets held by everyone. Percentages would be adjusted accordingly. 
The Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) mechanism
Participants interact with the mechanism in the form of an online, interactive program. They can log in at the scheduled time and participate from any computer with an appropriate internet connection. The process operates in real time during which they are able to place small "bets" on various levels of box office amounts. Figure 1 is a screen shot of the interface used by participants in the BOP exercises. The illustration is for a single film. For a given film, the potential opening weekend box office amount is partitioned into intervals that we will refer to as "buckets". 1 For description purposes, we will consider a single variable, say opening weekend box office for film i in week t, which we denote by Y i,t . The positive real line is partitioned K into intervals, the "buckets," where each interval represents a range of possible values for the opening weekend box office that will be officially reported when the movie opens. The leftmost and rightmost buckets are, respectively, [0, x 1 ) and [x K −1 , ∞). The bucket sizes for the example illustrated in Fig. 1 are $29,999. Mechanism organizers invite participants, who securely log in to their own account to access the IAM program. The mechanism makes "tickets" available for sale to participants, who spend an endowment of Francs (our synthetic experimental currency) on tickets and allocate them across the buckets. At the opening of each application, all participants are given a fixed budget of 500 Francs for each of the predicted variables. The Francs cannot be transferred among participants, used in other applications, or assigned to buckets for another film's BOP exercise. Each BOP session operates at a fixed time and only those invited are able to participate. The IAM program stores a wealth of data, including individual participant actions and time-stamps indicating when each of these actions took place.
The tickets for all buckets are priced the same and that price will increase at a preannounced rate to ensure the mechanism closes in a reasonable time. An example of the price is displayed in Fig. 1 . The opening price was constant for fifteen minutes at 5 Franks per ticket and then went up at a rate of one Franc per minute after that. These price changes discourage waiting until the last second to purchase, helping to offset individual incentives to hold back their private information and to improve their own information by learning from others' decisions. All participants are aware that their own information might be improved through seeing the purchases of others. They are also aware that their own information might be communicated by their own purchase of tickets. The temporal discounting helps to mitigate these strategic incentives that otherwise hinder successful information aggregation. 2 Throughout the operation of the mechanism, participants have a continuously available record of the number of tickets that are currently placed in each of the buckets. At each instant during the application, as well as at its termination, the placements of all tickets in all buckets are known as is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The individual participant also knows the proportion of tickets he or she holds in each bucket, which is particularly important because these proportions are the foundations for incentives. When the actual winning bucket becomes known, those holding tickets in that bucket are given a part of a grand prize equal to the proportion of the winning bucket tickets that he or she holds. If participant n holds z% of the tickets sold for the winning bucket then participant n gets z% of the incentive prize. For example, if the incentive prize was $1000 and the individual held 10% of the tickets sold for that bucket then the payment to participant n would be $100.
A typical BOP exercise involved forecasting two or three films. The exercise takes place once a week and requires about 30 min with the maximum possible being an hour. Each participant is given a separate Franc budget for each film they forecast. All budgets are the same size and the budgets are not fungible across the items forecast. The number of participants typically ranges from 10 to 20, and each operates from a secure computer located wherever the participant happened to be located (home, office, traveling, etc.) . Typically, the users are anonymous within the mechanism: Both the list of participants and the winners remain secret. Of course, the total of tickets purchased in each bucket of each forecast is public and known in real time as the tickets are purchased.
Guess of Guesses (GOG) mechanism
In sessions focused on the Guess of the Guesses mechanism, participants log in to the BOP session and before proceeding further are asked to make a guess about the opening box office of films that will open several months in the future. Thus, subjects who participated in the GOG mechanism also participated in the BOP mechanism afterward and of course, while participating in BOP had no information about the outcome of the GOG process. The horizon is beyond a time interval within which the realized box office data could practically be available for payment, implying the opening box office will not be known so cannot be used. Nevertheless, information could be available in the same form that becomes available for films in general. Of course, the guess cannot be made incentive compatible in the traditional sense of the term as realized accuracy of a guess cannot be the basis for a reward.
The GOG is based on the hypothesis that the best information about what others might believe is introspection. The intuition is that when uninformed about the opinion of others, individuals tend to use themselves as a model. 3 Thus, when guessing what others will guess, they are drawing on their own guess about the box office and rewarded if they are correct. That is, the best model a person has about the beliefs of others is his/her own beliefs. Thus, the GOG procedure rewards the individual according to the accuracy of their guess of others. Clearly, this has a potential for unconstrained possibilities as the infinite regress of the average thinking what the average thinks. Nevertheless, we implement the mechanism and test its performance.
Clearly the GOG mechanism is exploratory in that a formal theory that predicts success of the model does not exist. Figure 2 is the instruction given to subjects. Each subject is asked to make a guess about the box office of the film. However, the reward is given to the guess that is closest to the median of the other guesses. In case of ties, the reward is split.
Background
For decades, economic theory has explored the theory that markets collect and aggregate information contained in prices. Motivated by the rational expectations and finance literature Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) produced the first experimental demonstration that market equilibration and associated prices can perform an information aggregation function. The idea that markets could be designed and implemented to aggregate important information followed almost immediately with an application ? ? Fig. 2 Screen shot for GOG mechanism. The first pages of Boxoffice Prophecy ask you for your opinion about others' opinions. You are not paid on the accuracy of your answer with respect to the actual box office. You will be paid if you are the closest to the average (actually median) answer given by others to sales forecasting (Chen and Plott 2002; Plott 2000) and election predictions (Berg et al. 2008 ). These market-based applications were followed by of numbers of papers and interest sufficient to attract the attention of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.
While the feasibility of IAMs and their application to important problems is established, practical challenges are abundant. Market-based IAMs and prediction markets face practical challenges inside businesses. Real time, multiple markets of ArrowDebreu securities require training on tendering the bids and asks; inventory and cash management; and information management of time series of order flow data. In addition, market participation requires time. Management of markets requires infrastructure and time for posting results, constant encouragement for participation and technology repairs. Basically, the operation of continuous-time multiple markets is costly.
In a series of laboratory experiments, Plott et al. (2003) discovered that parimutuel betting systems are capable of performing information aggregation but the performance levels are poor. A long series of research papers isolated institutional improvements resulting in the architecture used here. 4 Continuous-time-order flow was shown to be important for information aggregation in the first market experiments and was retained in the pari-mutuel-based IAM. A tendency for participants to postpone ticket prices until final moments and free ride on information reveled by others was corrected by implementing an increasing price of tickets thereby making purchase delays costly (Axelrod et al. 2009 ). The speed of price increase became a tool to limit the time devoted to the exercise. The time required for participation and the timing of participation both reflected the opportunity cost of participation. The risk that is implicit in pari-mutuel betting had a tendency to inhibit ticket purchases and limit the inflow of information into the mechanism. The participation risk was corrected by removing the self-financing feature of pari-mutuel betting was replaced with a prize to winning bucket ticket holders in proportion to holdings. Ticket purchases were in terms of a synthetic currency that had no value outside the experiment and initial endowments of currency given to participants. Thus, the participants had an incentive to spend their entire budget and risk aversion was minimized as a barrier to participation ). Furthermore, relative purchasing power among participants and the selection of participants become controlled. Carefully constructed screens and instructions were needed to facilitate a quick and accurate understanding and avoid misconceptions about a mechanism that was otherwise very foreign to participants. As a result of a sequence of changes, the IAM efficiencies improved dramatically and are incorporated in the IAM studied here.
The first field application of the pari-mutuel IAM was conducted inside Intel Corporation (Gillen et al. 2015) . Among the many potential Intel applications those chosen existed in environments considered as good candidates for successes. Indeed, the performance of the IAM inside Intel is impressive in terms of assessing the probability of events and performance levels exceeding those of Intel official forecasts. The events were quarterly sales of well-defined categories of products. Past statistics were available as were quantitative measures, formal models and continuous updates of flows of indicator variables thought relevant. Participants were experienced sales personnel and managers with detailed knowledge of the business and had substantial experience working with the mechanism and understanding its accuracy.
By contrast, as a robustness test, the box office application goes beyond the Intel application in terms of (i) the inexperience of the participants (Intel participants had years of experience and feedback with the mechanism focused on the same or similar commodities while the subjects in the BOP had at most 20 decision sessions in which 77 different film box offices were considered); (ii) the poor quality of the information available to participants (Intel participants had flows of quantitative data, including statistical models, from a variety of sources that held information about upcoming sales while the BOP subjects had no systematic flow of data about the Australian box office of any particular movie).
The motion picture industry provides an example of products (i.e., movies) that are notarized for high levels of uncertainty (De Vany 2004) . The ability to predict box office revenues has proved challenging, but studies reveal the subtle sources where it might exist. Useful surveys of econometric and related studies are provided by Eliashberg et al. (2006) , Hadida (2008) and McKenzie (2012) . Other researchers have utilized data from online discussion forums and social networks to examine box office predictability. Mishne and Glance (2006) examine sentiment from weblogs. Doshi et al. (2010) use movie ratings (IMDb users and Rotten Tomatoes critics), social network analysis on Web sites and blogs, and sentiment analysis of IMDb forum posts. Asur and Huberman (2010) develop a model based on Twitter posts (tweet rate per day over the week prior to release). Mestyan et al. (2013) study data from Wikipedia editors and users. Recently, Google (2013) have also released a white paper documenting a predictive relationship between search volume and opening weekend box office revenues.
An ongoing market-based prediction exists as the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), a virtual stock market where participants trade stocks tied to box office revenue outcomes. A number of academics have noted that the prices correlate with actual box office outcomes including Pennock et al. (2001) , Spann and Skiera (2003) , Foutz and Jank (2010) and McKenzie (2013) . Another (discontinued) industry-based process developed by the popular Box Office Mojo movie Web site existed as the Box Office Derby and involved participants guessing box office for selected movies each week. McKenzie (2013) found the aggregated guesses are frequently close to the actual box office as well as being very highly correlated with the HSX predictions.
It is tempting to conclude that the information about box offices exists and is high quality but several features suggest that existing tests might not be particularly challenging. Predictions from HSX and Box Office Derby tend to be within the final week or, in the case of the HSX, the final closing price the day prior to release. 5 These mechanisms only consider movies with wide screen distribution, whereas smaller movies like art houses are not in the mix. Also, the HSX is widely known to have thousands of registered participants and McKenzie (2013) notes the Derby had 350-800 participants per week over his sample period. Anecdotally, it is also known that many of the HSX and Derby participants were employed within the industry and were possibly operated under incentives that differed from simply predicting the box office. Everything considered, the studies certainly suggest the existence of information, but its quality and the power of these mechanisms to collect it are questions that require study.
Procedures
Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of Guesses (GOG) sessions took place in a series of stages within the calendar years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 as was dictated by available funding. A total of 77 films were studied in 37 sessions resulting in 118 forecasts. Over this period, 167 participants were involved and paid a total of approximately $62,000 (AUD). The summary statistics are contained in Table 1 . During the period of the applications, the exchange rates ranged from 0.79 AU$ per US$ to 1.04 AU$ per US$, with the average being 0.95 AU$ per US$. Subjects received no other compensation other than the amounts earned in the sessions.
Subjects were a mix of current and former students of the Australian Film, Television and Radio School (AFTRS) as well as a small number of industry professionals working in various capacities within the industry (e.g., theatrical distribution or exhibition). Some of the students were actively engaged in film production and other parts of the industry, while others were full-time students. Potential subjects were contacted through lists of existing and previous students and instructed to log into the Boxoffice Prophecy Web site and register in the database if they were interested in participation. Once in the database, all communication was by email and regular updates to the Web site.
The website had instructions for participation ("Appendix 2"), a practice Web site that allowed practice alone or with others, a schedule of films together with standard release information about the film, and a list of frequently ask questions. The practice Web site had examples of historical applications including ticket purchases for different box office amounts for different movies together with the final box office. Thus, the participants had evidence that the ticket sales can carry information. The instructions provided perspective about mistakes typically associated with confusion from gambling systems to which they are often exposed, with questionnaires ensuring subject comprehension. For example, they were told that the task they were asked to perform was not to tell us their opinion about the film, its artistic quality, or its social value. The task was to make as much money as possible given their information and the decisions of others. They were also told that dominated strategies could be viewed as mistakes. In the BOP exercise, possible examples included putting all funds in one bucket when the subject did not think that bucket would win with certainty; putting nothing in buckets that were likely and for which ticket sales were low; buying multiple tickets in a bucket in which no one else is buying. The latter is dominated because if only one ticket is sold in a bucket the prize goes to the holder of that ticket so multiple tickets have no extra value if a buyer is alone. Over the weeks of each iteration, the results of previous BOP exercises including the investments in buckets and final box office outcome were added to the Web site.
Subjects were given private links to their own earnings. Payment was by deposit to their bank account. The Web site also had weekly information links that summarized the results of the previous week. The potential prizes and payoffs were announced as were other changes in the event that films were cancelled or other unexpected events occurred. They were told and reminded that a significant amount of prize money was available each week.
Movies, characteristics and measurements
The 77 films we analyze are listed in the table of "Appendix 1," which categorizes films according to (i) the Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and/or Guess of Guesses (GOG) date; (ii) the release date of the film; (iii) the bucket size for the particular title (see Table 2 Table 2 Film classification, bucket size, and range and discussion below); (iv) the film type used in the empirical analysis (Art House, Regular, or Blockbuster); (v) revenue definition (opening day, opening weekend or total theater run); (vi) list of BOP measurements; and (vii) list of GOG measurements. Art House films are typically released by small studios, while blockbusters are released by major studios backed by large production budgets and publicity. These terms are well-known to experts in the industry and films are readily classified accordingly, with the range of possible box office revenue suggested by historical experience. Table 2 lists the number of buckets and size used for the different movies. The number of buckets was always 16, dictated by interface screen size, judgments about instructions and other subjective issues associated with experimental design. The range of the buckets tended to be the same for similarly classified films. However, over the course of the trials some adjustments were made reflecting issues related to the film and economic conditions. For example, films could be delayed, cancelled, or changes could be made regarding the size of the opening.
A model for information aggregation in BOP and GOG
In order to evaluate the performance of the Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of Guesses (GOG) mechanisms, we develop a formal model of the information available to participants, how that information influences participants' beliefs, and how it relates to realized box office revenues. This characterization represents the aggregated information held by participants as a sufficient statistic reporting the expected likelihood of different possible box office ticket sales levels. We then model how incentives can guide participants to an equilibrium outcome in the BOP and GOG mechanisms that accurately aggregates this information. While other equilibria for the mechanisms might exist, the theoretical results establish that the observed success of these mechanisms as reported in laboratory environments is not inconsistent with theory and thus suggest the interpretation and application to other field environments.
Individual information and beliefs when the state of nature is a distribution
Boxoffice Prophecy and the Guess of Guesses mechanisms attempt to forecast an outcome that is subject to multiple tiers of uncertainty. Not only are participants uncertain about what final sales will be, they are uncertain about the conditional distribution from which realized sales will be drawn. This higher-order uncertainty requires describing a stochastic environment with aggregate uncertainty both in realized sales and in the conditional distribution over sales.
For ease of exposition, denote realized sales for movie t by Y t and suppose the potential values of realized sales are restricted to a discrete set of K different values, X = {x 1 , . . ., x K }, so that the distribution of realized sales can be represented by a multinomial distribution. Specifically, letting π k = Pr{Y t ∈ x k } and conditioning on π = [π 1 , . . ., π K ] , we can write Y t |π ∼ MN(π ) to represent the multinomial distribution for Y t 's realized value without further loss of generality.
How participants might learn about these probabilities is suggested by a direct application of the Bayes' rule. Suppose a player starts with some prior beliefs on the distribution over sales π ∼ F 0 (π ). As the player learns about the movie, its plot synopsis, directors, actors, budget, and other information, they will update their beliefs about this distribution. Indexing a representative player by n and denoting this acquired and perceived information by s n (π ), we can represent player n's beliefs given this information by the conditional distribution over probabilities π |s n ∼ F n (π ). Taking the conditional expectation of these probabilities, player n's expectation for the probability distribution over states can be denoted byπ n = E[π |s n ]. Given these expected probabilities, player n's expected value can be denotedȲ K k=1π * k X k represents the best forecast for possible box office revenues. As we will see in the next section, this distribution and aggregated expectation play a central role in defining the ex post equilibrium of BOP.
We define two different aspects of information aggregation corresponding to the different features of uncertainty captured by the BOP and GOG mechanisms. A mechanism aggregates distributional information if the mechanism generates a signal relating to the probabilities π that matchesπ * . Further, mechanism aggregates expectation information if the mechanism generates a forecast of sales that matchesȲ * As the BOP is designed to reflect the different probabilities of different outcomes, we can evaluate the degree to which it successfully aggregates distributional information as well as expectation information. The GOG mechanism is specifically focused on deriving a point estimate that characterizes expectations, so our tests focus primarily on whether the GOG aggregates expectation information. • A mechanism G that generates a forecastπ G for π aggregates distributional information ifπ G =π * .
Definition
• If the mechanism G generates a forecastŶ G for Y , that forecast aggregates expectation information ifŶ G =Ȳ * .
In a laboratory environment,π * is known by virtue of experimental controls and is thus available to researchers when testing the underlying model. However, in field environments, such as box office prediction, only the realized sales become available and only after the box office becomes known. By hypothesis, the best available information about the box office can be no better than the actual box office, which becomes the substance of tests and evaluations. We discuss these tests after presenting a summary of the data in the next section, now turning to consider how the mechanisms' incentives guide participants' behavior so that information aggregation can be achieved.
Incentives, behavior, and information aggregation in box office prophecy
The BOP mechanism shares many features with the Information Aggregation Mechanisms studied experimentally in Plott et al. (2003) and Axelrod et al. (2009) . The mechanism is closest to that studied in a field implementation forecasting revenue at Intel by Gillen et al. (2015) , which presents a general model that heavily influenced the discussion here. This model is used to characterize key features of the BOP's incentives and how they support distributional information aggregation. The model hinges on the incentives that encourage individuals to demonstrate their differential information in their ticket placements within the BOP. Through these incentives, private information becomes publicly revealed, with the mechanism providing a device for incorporating information into the information that has already been publicly revealed.
To characterize the BOP's state at instant t, suppose each bucket k has η (t) k tickets in it, allowing η (t) to denote the state vector of tickets across all buckets in the BOP. Suppose player n's interim posterior at time t after conditioning on the BOP's state and his private information, is characterized by expected bucket probabilities p
n,K . Abstracting from beliefs about future behavior, player n's expected payoff to placing an additional ticket in bucket x k would simply be his posterior expected probability for the realized outcome falling in that bucket divided by the number of tickets already placed in the bucket:
If player n is risk neutral, and an expected utility maximizing agent, then he would place his ticket in the bucket that has the best "odds," i.e., the bucket with the largest posterior likelihood p n,k relative to the number of tickets placed in that bucket (1+η (t) k ). Now, suppose player n has already placed ν n,k tickets in bucket x k while continuing to myopically ignore beliefs and considerations about future behavior. Accounting for previous placements by player n and others, the marginal expected payoff from placing an additional ticket in bucket
Notice that the placement is on the subjective most likely bucket and is thus information revealing only if ν n,k /η k is small. The property demonstrates that the capacity of ticket placement to reveal information is dependent on the path of the dynamic process of individual ticket placement.
Given these complex dynamics, it is tempting to conclude that information aggregation is not possible in the absence of a convincing theory of the dynamic path, so that the most conclusive theory to hope for would be an impossibility result. However, both our theoretical and empirical results demonstrate that this pessimism is not justified.
An expedient way to abstract from dynamics and ensure that the BOP mechanism doesn't distort incentives to report is to consider ex post equilibria. A strategy profile for player n can be represented by ν n = ν n,1 , . . . , ν n,K , the number of tickets placed in each of the K buckets. Following Krishna (2010)'s textbook definition of an ex post equilibrium, agents' strategies must represent best responses when evaluated after conditioning on all private signals. The beliefs implied by this information set conveniently matches the aggregated distributional information,π * = E [π |s 1 , . . . , s N ] introduced in the previous subsection. An important consequence of ex post equilibrium is that a consensus emerges in the sense that all agents have the same belief about the likelihood of different states. Further, for a strategy profile to represent an ex post equilibrium, all agent must have no incentive to change their own ticket placements given the placement of others, so that:
The theoretical concern, then, is whether or not the mechanism and its implementation introduce incentives leading participants to distort the aggregated distributional information. Our next result says that the answer is "no" by characterizing the unique ex post equilibrium for the mechanism and demonstrating that information aggregates in this equilibrium.
Theorem Maintaining the assumptions used to define information aggregation, suppose all players follow the symmetric strategy of placing tickets so that ν n ∝π * . Then: (a) This outcome represents an ex post Nash Equilibrium of the BOP Mechanism. (b) This outcome is the unique ex post Nash Equilibrium of the mechanism. (c) The distribution over tickets for the BOP mechanism under the ex post equilibrium aggregates distributional information about box office sales.
Proof We begin by demonstrating that the proposed strategy profile constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium. Suppose ν i ∝π * for all i except n. Given the information available about expected bucket probabilities and other players' ticket placements, it is optimal for player n to also place their tickets proportionally to the expected bucket probabilities. This partial-equilibrium result establishes that ν n ∝π * is a best response for all players.
(a) Consider the decision problem faced by the nth player, conditioning on the players' beliefsp n,k =π * ,k and the assumption that all other players are placing their tickets proportionally to the aggregate posterior beliefs. Player n's payoff from any ticket allocation is:
Taking first-order conditions of the Lagrangian that incorporates a shadow cost (λ) for the constraint that tickets be fully allocated:
The budget constraint enforces these first-order conditions to balance across each of the K buckets, so player n's utility maximizing strategy accords with the equilibrium prediction that the players allocate tickets according to the posterior expected bucket probabilities.
We now establish uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. First, we show that at least one player has a profitable deviation if the IAM's aggregate distribution of tickets is not proportional to the agreed-upon posterior odds. Second, we show that at least one player has a profitable deviation if the ticket allocations are asymmetric even though the aggregate distribution of tickets may be proportional to the agreed-upon posterior odds. (i) Denote the IAM's distribution of tickets over buckets by η and suppose η is not proportional toπ * , then at least one player has a profitable deviation. Without loss of generality, supposeπ * ,1 > η 1 and order the indices so that
Choose as player 1 a subject that weakly underallocates tickets to bucket 1, so that
Consider the gains and losses to player 1 from shifting ε tickets from bucket k to bucket 1.
Gains from increasing ν 1,1 :
We want to show that this deviation is profitable for some ε > 0, for which it will be sufficient to show:
This inequality holds by the assumptions of our construction:
(ii) Suppose the IAM's distribution of tickets is proportional toπ * , so thatπ * ,1
, but two players are not playing the same strategy. At least one player has a profitable deviation. Suppose player 1's allocation differs from the IAM odds. Let
= η 2 + ξ , and consider the gains and losses to player 1 from shifting ε = ξ/N tickets from bucket 2 to bucket 1.
We will show this deviation is profitable by verifying that:
This inequality can be established by direct substitution: The theory identifies the possibility of information aggregation. It also suggests the possibilities of information aggregation failure that may result from the difficulties of operation, complexity regarding screen displays, dynamics of adjustment, the existence of multiple equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. Thus, information aggregation is an empirical issue. In the next section we explore the empirical evidence.
The possibility of expectational information aggregation in Guess of Guesses
The Guess of Guesses (GOG) mechanism is analyzed from the perspective of player 1 without loss of generality. Consider ex post deviations in the mechanism, allowing player 1 to revise her guess after observing the choices of all other players in GOG. Clearly, she would be able to compute the median of those guesses and identify either a new guess that would be the unique median or pool with the other players submitting the median guess. Extending this logic, ex post equilibrium restricts all players to submit identical guesses while placing no limitation on what the coordinated guess must be. Given the single-shot nature of the mechanism, however, such coordination is clearly implausible. Consequently, we need to consider how player's form beliefs about other players' guesses and how they react to those beliefs in reporting their own guess. The issue is resolved by the observation that if a player believes that the other's beliefs are the same as their own beliefs, in which case the optimal strategy is to report that belief. This assumption is supported by the law of iterated expectations, since the coarsened expectation of a more refined conditional expectation is simply the coarsened expectation. More precisely, for any random variable
, so that when accounting for uncertainty in the distribution over box office revenues when taking the conditional expectation:
Applying this result to the problem of guessing the median forecast requires assuming symmetry for the distribution over sales. Under symmetry, the median will equal the expectation and so we can apply the law of iterated expectations directly to the conditional median. Though the distribution of box office revenues will likely tend to be skewed, this distortion does not seem to dramatically impact the performance of the GOG mechanism.
We close this section by again noting that information aggregation within the GOG mechanism is not a necessary outcome, but simply a possible outcome. The degree to which information aggregates in practice using either the BOP or the GOG mechanism is an empirical question. We do note, however, that information contained in GOG must reflect the private information held by individuals prior to the implementation of BOP. Our discussion here simply motivates some of the economic reasoning supporting this possibility as a means of motivating the empirical analysis in the next section.
Results: mechanism performance
This section considers the empirical evidence from Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of Guesses (GOG) to test the degree to which the two mechanisms aggregate information and elicit beliefs. We begin by analyzing forecasts derived from each of the mechanisms and the information content of these forecasts indicates that both mechanisms effectively aggregate expectation information. This result indicates both that our subjects have information about the box office potential for a given movie and that the mechanisms can collect that information. Since the BOP reveals greater detail about participants' beliefs, we can also investigate the degree to which the BOP aggregates distributional information. We find the aggregated distribution reported by the BOP accurately matches the likelihood of different outcomes. We close this section by returning to the GOG mechanism and, by analyzing the distribution over guesses, suggest the mechanism is eliciting a measure of central tendency for each participant's beliefs.
Expectation information aggregation in BOP and GOG
If a mechanism aggregates expectation information, then measures of those expectations from the mechanism should present rational forecasts for realized sales. As the first step in investigating expectation information aggregation, we define natural forecasts for the two mechanisms. The mean BOP forecast is calculated as the mean of the forecast distribution for each trial of the BOP mechanism. 6 The GOG forecast is calculated as the average guess reported in the guess of the median guess mechanism. These forecasts could be defined differently, such as using medians or modes from the mechanisms' reports, but these alternative formulations give qualitatively similar results.
Summary statistics and forecast accuracy
Table 3 presents summary box office statistics for the movies we studied, along with statistics describing the two mean forecasts. 7 In the sample for all movies, the BOP forecasts are slightly optimistic, with an average box office forecast of AU$200k above the actual box office. The root-mean-square forecast error (RMSFE) provides a good first-look at forecast accuracy. Comparing the forecasts' RMSFE to the standard deviation of box office revenues indicates the degree to which the mechanisms improve upon the ex post average as a benchmark forecast. These forecasts perform reasonably well with a root-mean-square forecast error (RMSFE) of AU$2m compared to a cross- SD are calculated across movies in each of the subsamples. The Boxoffice Prophecy Mean Forecast corresponds to the mean of the forecast distribution from the Boxoffice Prophecy mechanism, with average, SD, and root-mean-square forecast error (RMSFE) calculated across markets (i.e., for each round of the BOP or GOG). The Guess of Guesses forecast corresponds to the average reported guess in the Guess of Guesses mechanism. Note that some movies in Boxoffice Prophecy test set were implemented in multiple BOP markets. Also, some of the movies implemented in the BOP mechanism were not implemented in GOG and vice-versa sectional standard deviation of AU$7m, the latter of which corresponds to the RMSFE of using the ex post sample average as a forecast. The forecast presents an especially significant improvement over the ex post average for Blockbuster movies, which have substantially greater variability in revenue.
Forecast rationality and robustness tests
To provide a more refined perspective of the information content of the mechanisms' forecasts, we apply standard tests for forecast evaluation. Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions evaluate the scale and bias of a forecast by regressing the realized outcome (Y t ) on a constant and the forecast (Ŷ t ):
An unbiased forecast will have α = 0 and a forecast with accurate scaling would have β = 1. Each of these hypotheses can be evaluated individually using a t test and, jointly, using an F test. Figure 3 presents the results of these forecast tests for opening weekend revenues beneath scatter plots corresponding to the fitted-line regressions. In aggregate, the forecast line fits are remarkably accurate, with a statistically insignificant intercept and a coefficient that does not significantly deviate from unity. The F-statistics for the Mincer-Zarnowitz test have p values of 95% for the BOP mechanism and 23% for the GOG mechanism, suggesting the joint restrictions of forecast rationality are not rejected by the two mechanisms. Overall, the R 2 indicates the BOP mechanism forecasts reflect 92% of the variability in movie revenue while the GOG mechanism The category of a movie was determined by the researchers prior to operation of the mechanism reflects 69% of this variation, though much of that heterogeneity is generated by the different types of movies included in the sample.
To evaluate the robustness of these results, we analyze the forecast accuracy in some subsamples of the BOP data, slicing according to the type of movie for which revenues are being forecast. The summary statistics for each subsample appear in Table 3 and the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions, along with the corresponding scatter plots, appear in Fig. 4 . These results illustrate the robustness of information aggregation across the different movie markets, indicating that the BOP mean performs quite well with regular movies and blockbusters, but underperform in forecasting opening box office for art house movies. The latter performance breakdown is driven by two artifacts that made these movies particularly difficult to forecast. First, there is relatively little variability in the revenues for our sample of art house movies. Consequently, the simple average revenue for art house movies in general is a good forecast for any single art house movie. Second, the buckets used for BOP in the art house movies may have been too large. In some of these movies, the smallest bucket was AU$250k, censoring the forecasts for movies that had an average revenue of AU$400k. Out of twenty available buckets, the median winning bin for Art House movies was Bin 3, which on average represented a cumulated 34% of the IAM distribution. In contrast, the median winning bin for Regular and Blockbuster movies was Bin 5, which accounted for a cumulated 52% of the IAM distribution, indicating the bins for those movies were better calibrated to the problem.
Comparing BOP and GOG forecast accuracy
In looking at the properties of the GOG forecasts, we first note that the average box office for movies in this mechanism is much higher than the average in the BOP. This selection of more blockbuster-like movies into the GOG tests is driven by the longterm nature of the GOG mechanism. Movies that have six months of lead time before their opening tend to be larger productions requiring more intensive production and marketing efforts. The forecasts themselves tended to have a bit more of a negative bias, understating average box office revenues by about AU$1.75M. However, despite this bias, the RMSFE for the GOG forecasts represents a significant improvement over the unconditional standard deviation of box office themselves. As such, the GOG forecasts do reflect substantial information about potential box office revenues.
For a subsample of the movies in the 2010 iteration, we have concurrent forecasts available from both the BOP and GOG mechanisms. Within this subsample, we can directly test the accuracy of the forecasts using Diebold and Mariano (1995) tests. These are simple t tests that evaluate whether the mean forecast loss from the BOP forecast is lower than the mean forecast loss from the GOG forecast. Specifically, for each movie and forecast mechanism, we define the forecast loss using squared error:
With this forecast loss, we can calculate the difference in forecast loss between the two mechanisms as:
If BOP and GOG are equally accurate, the expected difference in loss between the two mechanisms would be zero. Consequently, we can use a t test to evaluate this hypothesis, E[δ t ] = 0, against the alternative that BOP is more (less) accurate than
The results of the Diebold-Mariano tests appear in Table 4 , Panel A. Despite BOP delivering a more accurate forecast for 59% of movies, the small sample of only 23 forecasts is too small and variable for this difference in loss to represent a statistically significant difference in average performance.
Given the inconclusive results from the Diebold-Mariano tests, we might wish to consider the information content of the two forecasts. Specifically, if we were to combine the BOP and GOG forecasts, how much weight would we assign to the BOP forecast and how much would we assign to GOG? These weights can be easily calculated from the Fair-Shiller regressions:
The results reported in Table 4 , Panel B, indicate that significant weight in a combined forecast is assigned to the both forecast mechanisms. The weight assigned to BOP is not statistically different from zero and the weight assigned to GOG isn't significantly differentiated from one. These joint restrictions are tested in the Encompassing tests, which are F tests for the joint hypothesis that the weight to one forecast is equal to one while the weight of another is equal to zero. We can reject both the null hypothesis that the GOG forecast encompasses the BOP forecast (i.e., that ω GOG = 1∩ω BOP = 0 with a p value of 0%) as well as the hypothesis that BOP encompasses the GOG forecast (ω GOG = 0 ∩ ω BOP = 1 with a p value that also rounds to 0%). These results indicate that both mechanisms contain useful information for forecasting actual box office sales. These results raise the question of what causes the two mechanisms to generate differential and separately informative signals about box office revenue. One possibility is that both mechanisms, by asking similar questions, cause subjects to consider different aspects of a movie and its potential box office appeal in reporting their forecasts. Another possibility is that the BOP mechanism, by allowing for interactions among participants, leads to more refined information aggregation than is achieved by the GOG mechanism's inherently private format. This interpretation suggests that the BOP mechanism is able to avoid the "private equilibrium" pitfall that presents theoretical challenges to information aggregation in market mechanisms.
Distributional information aggregation in BOP
If none of our participants have any information at all about how movies will perform, no mechanism for aggregating their information would have any ability to forecast box office revenues. However, the summary statistics in Table 3 indicates that our study participants do have valuable information for forecasting box office sales, particularly in larger movies. The next question we investigate concerns how accurately the BOP recovers and reports this information. To evaluate this question, we translate the realized box office revenues into the quantiles from the BOP forecast distribution. Suppose the proportion of tickets in each bucket k for movie i's BOP is η k and denote the realized box office revenues by Y i , we compute the BOP quantile, denoted Q i , using the formula: If the BOP's distribution over tickets accurately reflects the true uncertainty in the distribution over realized sales, then these quantiles will be uniformly distributed. We can use this result to test the BOP's performance using a calibration test following Foster and Vohra (1998) . If either our participants lack information about box office revenues or if the BOP fails to aggregate that information, then a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test would reject the null hypothesis that these quantiles are drawn from a uniform distribution. 8 Figure 5 's Panel A plots the cumulative distribution function for these quantiles against the CDF for a uniform distribution. The apparent accuracy of the BOP's distribution is truly striking. The CDF very closely tracks the 45-degree line implied by the uniform distribution, with the mean absolute deviation of only 6%. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test statistic achieves a p value of 62%, which is strikingly high even though the sample consists of only 74 observations. In order to explore the robustness of BOP's accuracy in characterizing the distribution of a movie's opening weekend box office revenues, we again turn to the subsamples for forecasts by different movie types. These results are reported in panels B, C, and D of Fig. 5 . None of these tests indicate the distribution over quantiles is statistically significantly different from the uniform distribution for any of the samples. However, this finding could be driven by a lack of power due to the limited sample sizes in these subsamples.
While the distributions over quantiles for Regular and Blockbuster movies are nearly identical to the uniform, the results for Art House movies appear to be somewhat distorted. The S-shaped distortion in Art House movies is similar to the Reverse Favorite-Long-Shot Bias observed by Gillen et al. (2015) when generating sales forecasts in settings with little information available to participants. 9 This relationship could indicate that participants had relatively poor information available to forecast the box office for Art House movies, likely because such movies have smaller budgets and are often staffed with less well-known film crews and actors.
Conclusions
The paper focus is the performance of information aggregation mechanisms (IAMs) when applied to forthcoming films in Australia that consist of a variety of different types of films and time frames. Three unknowns form the questions posed for research. Do the intuitions and subjectively held beliefs of a group of film students and industry practitioners contain solid information about the box office of upcoming films? Do either or both of the proposed information aggregations mechanisms (IAMs) collect and organize the beliefs and associated information? How can we know?
The data indicate that the information sought by the mechanisms exists and can be measured. Successful operation is dependent on the information held by participants but a large number of participants is not needed and could be harmful if a large proportion is completely uninformed. The information is not found only in highly technical and experienced sources. Specifically, the intuitions of the participants as measured by the pari-mutuel procedures do contain information about future box office magnitudes, and it could be important that this fact was demonstrated to the participants themselves by the early successes of short term predications. The strong correlation between the median of these opinions and the outcome is not an accidental correlation. The conclusion is supported by aggregate distributional information in addition to expectational information. The K-S tests are particularly accurate for regular and blockbuster films while the data from Art House movies appears driven by censoring.
Both the Boxoffice Prophecy (derived from pari-mutuel betting processes) and the Guess of Guesses (incentivized guess of what others will guess) show promise as information aggregation mechanisms. Support is found the summary statistics regarding RMSFE and in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions for forecast accuracy. The data suggest that the BOP provides more accurate and more precise forecasts. In particular, the Diebold-Mariano tests show BOP to be more accurate and encompassing tests indicate the BOP forecast contains information not contained in the GOG even though both contain information not contained in the other. The fact that GOG represents accuracy based only on private information, acquired without the benefit of conversations with others, supports an interpretation of the difference between the GOG and BOP as a consequence of information aggregation. The private information held by individuals and reflected in their GOG behavior as compared to the information subsequently gathered in the BOP process, reflects information aggregation resulting from the application of the BOP.
A more philosophical question rests beneath the practical questions. The mechanisms were developed from incomplete theory tested through laboratory methods. The natural question is whether or not the laboratory methods from experimental economics tell us anything about the operations of the naturally occurring phenomena found in field environments? The first challenge rests on a model that that translates the abstract features of the model into the operational concepts required to connect the model to variables found naturally occurring. The logic of the argument is driven by the marginal incentives in the presence of disagreement that introduce profitable deviations inconsistent with market equilibrium. The approach rests on an assumption that the information about the box office is in the form of a distribution of possible outcomes and that information aggregation should result in a distribution. The model is developed to produce and test a full frequency distribution of box office revenues in addition to testing the accuracy of a prediction of the expected value of box office revenues. The latter is important because some IAMs like the GOG, make only point predictions. The developments allow tests of accuracy of the two IAMs as well as comparisons of their relative accuracy.
The second challenge focused on whether or not the economic principles uncovered in laboratory experiments and the procedures that evolved from laboratory experiences are sufficiently robust to justify a degree of trust in them when applied to substantially different conditions found outside the laboratory. The paper offers a step in toward meeting both challenges. The theory of how the mechanism works draws from both market theory and game theory but the understanding provided by these theories is incomplete, leaving much open for empirical resolution and a healthy application of "as if" methodologies. The broad empirical relationships suggested do exist and are open invitations for theoretical work. The distribution of box office predicted is close to the actual distribution of box office amounts. Using a K-S test the hypotheses that the two distributions are the same, the predicted and the actual, cannot be rejected. This result demonstrates that the information exists in the intuitions of the test group and that it is collected by the IAM. Using the RMSFE the expectations prediction of both the BOP and GOG cannot be rejected as producing an accurate mean of the actual box office amounts. The accuracy is supported for all types of movies and all futures but films classified as Art House are the least predictable and predictability degrades as the distance of the prediction advances in the future. Comparisons of the two IAM reveal that BOP is more accurate than GOG.
Reflections on the underlying methodological and philosophical issues give a clear message. The intuitions of individuals as represented by subjective probabilities do contain solid information. The basic principles of economics are remarkably robust and are usefully captured by laboratory experimental methods.
